Same sex unions at the Strasbourg Court in a divided Europe : driving forward reform or protecting the Court’s authority via consensus analysis? by Fenwick,  H.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
20 June 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Fenwick, H. (2016) 'Same sex unions at the Strasbourg Court in a divided Europe : driving forward reform or
protecting the Court's authority via consensus analysis?', European human rights law review., 2016 (3).
249-272 .
Further information on publisher's website:
http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/ProductDetails.aspx?recordid=388productid=6823
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication inEuropean Human Rights Law
Reviewfollowing peer review. The deﬁnitive published versionFenwick, H. (2016). Same sex unions at the Strasbourg
Court in a divided Europe: driving forward reform or protecting the Court's authority via consensus analysis? European
Human Rights Law Review 2016(3): 249-272is available online onWestlaw UKor fromThomson Reuters DocDel service.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
Same sex unions at the Strasbourg Court in a divided Europe: driving 
forward reform or protecting the Court’s authority via consensus analysis?  
 
Key words: same sex registered partnerships, marriage, Articles 8,14,12 ECHR 
 
Abstract:  
 
This article considers the division in Europe on the matter of recognition and protection of 
same sex relationships in the form of registered partnerships or marriage, an issue of especial 
significance at the present time in a number of Council of Europe states. It examines the 
developing Strasbourg jurisprudence that has incrementally contributed to the increasing 
spread of such protection and recognition across Europe, with a view to arguing that within it 
the Court appears to be seeking to reconcile two conflicting aims. It appears to intend to 
continue to combat the notion that same sex and different sex couples can be treated 
differently in this respect by states. But it is also seeking to preserve its own authority in the 
face of the opposition of certain Central and Eastern European states to introduction of formal 
frameworks affording protection and recognition to same sex relationships. In seeking to 
reconcile the two aims, it has placed reliance on forms of consensus analysis in the member 
states, due to the link between such analysis and the grant of a wide margin of appreciation to 
a member state. But, as will be argued, its use of such analysis in this context has tended 
towards arbitrariness. Its approach therefore raises the question, explored below, whether the 
project it has tentatively embraced, of pushing forward the introduction of same sex 
registered partnerships or marriage in member states which have not introduced such 
measures, is advancing with particular caution to avoid undermining acceptance of the 
authority of the Court in such states.  
 
Introduction 
 
State acceptance of same sex relationships divides Europe: while a number of Western 
European states have introduced same sex marriage,
1
 and/or civil partnerships,
2
 or are about 
                                                          
Unless otherwise stated all URLS were last accessed 1 March 2016. My thanks are due to J Scherpe and R 
Wintemute for comments in July 2015 on an early draft of the paper this piece is partly based on.  
1
 For a list of states that have introduced same sex marriage see note 149 below. 
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to do so,
3
 a number of Central and Eastern ones
4
 have no legislative framework for the 
recognition of such partnerships and have barred same sex marriage constitutionally.
5
 In 
addressing claims for official recognition of same sex unions the Strasbourg Court has 
therefore found itself confronting discrimination against a sexual minority while seeking to 
maintain its own credibility and authority which would be threatened if it developed rights to 
such recognition that a number of states would be likely to greet with hostility and resistance.  
 
The Court does not and cannot rely on coercion: it relies on member states to implement its 
judgments.
6
 Its legitimacy in general may be viewed as having varying aspects which are not 
necessarily in harmony with each other; it inevitably relates to the extent to which states are 
observed to acquiesce in its judgments,
7
 which also appear to command a measure of Europe-
wide agreement. In normative terms its judgments would be expected to be reflective of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2
 For a full list see note 110 below. The term ‘registered partnerships’ will be used as the generally accepted 
generic term from this point. 
3
 For states shortly to introduce same sex marriage or registered partnerships see note 151 below. 
4
 The term ‘Central and Eastern European’ member states of the Council of Europe will be taken to include: 
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Hungary, Moldova, Macedonia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. The member states of Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey are listed by some authorities as European, by others as Asian. 
There is no clear consensus as to the states that make up Central and Eastern Europe, but for convenience the 
term ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ will be used to refer to all these member states. ‘European consensus’ will be 
taken to refer to identifying a consensus among all the Council of Europe contracting states, although it is 
acknowledged that including the latter group of states will tend inevitably to reduce the consensus in this 
context. 
5
 For example, on 5 June 2014 Slovakia's Parliament amended its constitution to define marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman: see Jurist 5 June 2014 ‘Slovakia amends constitution to define marriage as 
between one man and one woman’ at http://jurist.org. See note 159 below as to constitutional amendments 
designed to exclude same sex marriage in a number of Central and Eastern European states. 
6
 Under Article 46(1) ECHR states are bound by final judgments against them, meaning that the state should 
take steps to implement the judgment; the Committee of Ministers supervises the implementation (Article 
46(2)). But persistent resistance to the Court’s judgments is already apparent in other contexts in relation, in 
particular, to the Ukraine and Russia. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights ‘notes with concern that the prevailing challenges facing the Court, most notably the 
high number of repetitive applications as well as persisting human rights violations of a particularly serious 
nature, reveal a failure by certain High Contracting Parties to discharge their obligations under the Convention’: 
‘The effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights: the Brighton Declaration and beyond’ AS/Jur 
(2014) 33. See also the Brussels declaration 2015: ‘emphasis must now be placed on the current challenges, in 
particular the repetitive applications resulting from the non-execution of Court judgments, the time taken by the 
Court to consider and decide upon potentially well-founded cases, the growing number of judgments under 
supervision by the Committee of Ministers and the difficulties of States Parties in executing certain judgments 
due to the scale, nature or cost of the problems raised’ (‘Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, our shared responsibility’ 27 March 2015, at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2308041&Site=CM). 
See further the 8th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers (2014). See also note 17 below. 
7
 This sociological aspect of the concept of legitimacy derives in part from Weber: see M. Weber, Economy and 
Society 5 (1922, Jackson: University of California Press, Eng tr, 1969). See J. Bensman ‘Max Weber’s concept 
of legitimacy’ in A. Vidich and R. Glassman (eds), Conflict and Control: Challenges to Legitimacy of Modern 
Governments (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), 17-48; N. Grossman ‘The Normative Legitimacy of 
International Courts’ (2013) 86 Temple Law Review 61, 80, 86, 91; see also K Dzehtsiarou European Consensus 
and the Legitimacy of the ECtHR (CUP, 2015), esp chap 6. 
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fundamental rights in the sense that a basic, not necessarily expansive, standard of rights is 
maintained uniformly across member states. The standing of its judgments in Europe cannot 
be divorced from their normative content or from their procedural integrity, which is reliant 
on demonstrating reasoning processes that adhere to principles of legal certainty and are 
transparent, consistent, clear.
8
 However, reconciling these aspects of its legitimacy with each 
other is problematic, especially in this context, which appears to arouse greater controversy 
than does addressing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation more generally. The 
more that the Court relies on the interpretative method
9
 to advance rights, especially in 
relation to social issues where there is considerable disagreement among member states as to 
the moral principles at stake, the less it can be assured that all the states would sustain 
consent to such developments,
10
 leading it to rely heavily on established methods of creating 
self-restraint, based on the principle of enhanced subsidiarity and realised through the margin 
of appreciation doctrine, closely linked to European consensus-based analysis.  
 
But reliance on finding a European consensus in socially sensitive contexts can merely lead 
to acceptance of detrimental treatment of groups traditionally vulnerable to discrimination, 
including women,
11
 and sexual minorities. In the context under discussion such reliance 
creates, as will be argued, the danger that the Strasbourg jurisprudence will be influenced by 
national choices arising from prevailing discriminatory attitudes against homosexuals in 
certain member states.
12
 In such states it is clear that a deliberate choice has been made to 
oppose the introduction of same sex registered partnerships and, a fortiori, same sex 
marriage, while in a number of them Constitutional guarantees of equality exclude one 
particular minority group – members of the LGBT community13 (although that is not 
necessarily conclusive: inclusion of that group in the protection against discrimination could 
occur via interpretation). Against that background, reliance on identifying a consensus in 
Europe to push forward formal state protection for same sex unions risks undermining the 
                                                          
8
 It itself has emphasised those qualities in its ‘prescribed by law’ jurisprudence, although that jurisprudence is 
very far from setting a high standard. But outside that jurisprudence the standards contemplated as to the Court’s 
own reasoning are higher: see eg Demir v Turkey (2009) 48 EHRR 54 in which the Court indicated that it should 
adhere to the principles of ‘legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law’ (at [153]). See further on 
the issue of procedural legitimacy K. Dzehtsiarou ‘Does consensus matter? Legitimacy of European consensus 
in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) PL 534, 537. 
9
 See for discussion G. Letsas A Theory of Interpretation of the ECHR (OUP, 2007) Chap 3. 
10
 See further M. Kumm, ‘The legitimacy of international law: a constitutionalist framework of analysis’ (2004) 
15 European Journal of International Law 907. 
11
 The use of consensus analysis in ABC v Ireland (2011) 53 EHRR 13 provides the most pertinent example; see 
note 27 below. 
12
 See notes 133 and 134 below. 
13
 See note 155 below. 
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role of the Court in normative legitimacy terms, as the guardian of the ECHR’s underlying 
values, including protection for minority groups against majoritarian oppression,
14
 and for 
individual dignity.
15
 Its resultant stance stands in strong contrast to that of the US Supreme 
Court which in a historic judgment recently found a constitutional right to same sex marriage 
in Obergefell.
16
  
 
Clearly, the legal positions of the two courts are dissimilar: the Strasbourg Court, unlike the 
US Supreme Court, cannot ensure the implementation of its judgments by courts in member 
states, and is operating in the context of international law which respects state sovereignty, as 
reflected in the margin of appreciation doctrine, the position of the rights in national law, and 
the ECHR enforcement arrangements, based on the principle of subsidiarity.
17
 But reliance on 
that doctrine is especially problematic in the context under discussion, as this article 
contends, in exploring the implications of the Court’s incrementally developing jurisprudence 
for a number of Central and Eastern European states demonstrating varying levels of hostility 
towards same sex couples.
18
 It considers that jurisprudence addressing claims for state 
recognition of same sex relationships, including marriage,
19
 in order to argue that it reveals 
with particular force the problem of relying on identifying a consensus in relation to 
addressing discrimination. The Court is seeking to avoid undermining an increasingly fragile 
                                                          
14
 See G. Letsas A Theory of Interpretation of the ECHR (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 122-123 as to the potential 
violation of rights created by allowing communal morality to limit rights.  
15
 See D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: OUP, 2001), Chap 1.   
16
 Obergefell v Hodges 576 US (2015) June 26. 
17
 See notes 6 and 21. A contracting state could denounce the ECHR at any time (Article 58 ECHR) and leave 
the Convention system. States that object to judgments of the US Supreme Court may not secede from the USA 
and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. 
18
 For example, a 2013 survey by the Levada Centre found that 74% of Russians considered that society should 
reject homosexuals; 16% of Russians thought gay people should be isolated from society; 22% thought they 
should be forced to undergo treatment; 5% thought they should be ‘liquidated’. A further survey from the Centre 
(reported 6 October 2015) found in answer to the question ‘How would you feel if same sex marriage were 
permitted in Russia?’ that 26% of respondents would react ‘somewhat negatively’; 58% ‘entirely negatively’ (at 
http://www.advocate.com/society/culture/2013/08/06/74-russians-reject-homosexuality-says-survey). See also 
notes 133 and 134 below. 
19
 This article is not taking the stance that marriage per se necessarily represents a desirable means of creating 
recognition of a relationship (see on this point M. Fineman The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New 
York: New Press, 2005)). Its stance is that marriage provides in member states a level of civic benefits, 
unmatched by that available in respect of cohabitation, from which same sex couples should not be 
automatically excluded, and that, moreover, making provision only for registered partnerships means denying 
same sex couples a choice a number of them would prefer to be able to make (in the UK, from the office of 
national statistics: 7,366 marriages were formed between same sex couples between 29 March 2014 and 30 June 
2015; 7,732 couples chose to convert their existing civil partnership into a marriage between 10 December 2014 
and 30 June 2015; marriages of same sex couples could be formed from 29 March 2014; from February 2014, 
the number of civil partnerships formed each month began to fall notably when compared with the same month 
a year earlier; in December 2014, only 58 civil partnerships were formed compared with 314 in December 2013, 
a fall of 82% (www.ons.gov.uk)).   
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acceptance in certain member states as to its role
20
 on a culturally sensitive social issue, by 
relying on consensus analysis, but at the same time it is aiding the ongoing spread of same 
sex registered partnerships across the region. The discussion below explores the approach the 
Court has taken in seeking to reconcile the two aims in relation to same sex marriage as well 
as to such partnerships.  
 
Subsidiarity-related Strasbourg mechanisms  
 
The well-established interpretivist tradition of the Court - extending the scope of the rights by 
evolutive interpretation - is generally viewed as rendered palatable to member states, 
especially the more socially conservative ones, by reliance on subsidiarity-related devices.  
Their role has recently been emphasised more strongly by the Council of Europe as is 
apparent in respect of the pressure the Court has come under recently, especially after the 
Brighton and Brussels declarations,
21
 to give greater recognition to a principle that may be 
termed that of enhanced subsidiarity, leading to a stronger affirmation of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine,
22
 which is intricately linked to European consensus analysis.
23
  
 
At this point elaboration is required as to the nature of consensus-based analysis. Put 
simplistically, identifying the existence of a consensus in Europe is often taken to denote 
identifying common ground between the laws of a majority of member states in relation to 
                                                          
20
 In particular, the Supreme Russian Court has found that the national Constitution takes precedence over the 
ECHR, and decisions by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) should be upheld only if they do not 
contradict basic Russian law (see Russia Today ‘Constitutional Court rules Russian law above European HR 
Court decisions,’ 14 July 2015, at https://www.rt.com/politics/273523-russia-court-rights-constitution/). 
21
 See the Brighton Declaration ‘High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
19-20 April 2012, para 3: ‘The States Parties and the Court share responsibility for realising the effective 
implementation of the Convention, underpinned by the fundamental principle of subsidiarity’. The Brussels 
declaration, 2015, n 6 above, stated that it ‘Reiterates the subsidiary nature of the supervisory mechanism 
established by the Convention and in particular the primary role played by national authorities, namely 
governments, courts and parliaments, and their margin of appreciation in guaranteeing and protecting human 
rights at national level’ (www.echr.coe). Protocol No. 15, adopted in May 2013 and in the process of ratification 
by the 47 Contracting Parties, will add references to the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity to the Preamble 
of the ECHR. See H. Fenwick ' Enhanced Subsidiarity and a Dialogic Approach – or Appeasement in recent cases 
on criminal justice, public order, counter-terrorism at Strasbourg against the UK?’ in The UK and European Human 
Rights: A Strained Relationship? K Ziegler, E Wicks, L Hodson (eds) (Hart, 2015). 
22
 See A. Legg The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality 
(Oxford: OUP, 2012). See as regards subsidiarity: H. Fenwick, note 21 above. Spielmann finds that reliance on 
the margin of appreciation ‘makes for a body of human rights law that accepts pluralism over uniformity, as 
long as the fundamental guarantees are effectively observed’: D. Spielmann, ‘Whither the margin of 
appreciation?’(2014) 67 Current Legal Problems 49, 49. 
23
 See L. Wildhaber, A. Hjartarson and S. Donnelly, ‘No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 33 Human Rights Law Journal 248, 252. 
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domestic protection for particular rights,
24
 tending to find that if such a consensus is 
identified, a narrow margin of appreciation only will tend to be conceded to the state in 
question, unless it can make a special case to justify its non-protection of the right.
25
 If no 
consensus on an issue can be discerned, the margin will tend to remain wide, meaning that 
the justification put forward for failing to introduce a rights-protecting measure is not closely 
scrutinised, so the demands of proportionality are much more readily satisfied.
26
 
 
But such a conventional analysis of the relationship between consensus-based analysis and 
the margin of appreciation doctrine would fail to capture its malleability. In practice, 
uncertainty arises as to every aspect of it: the decision as to whether or how far any reliance 
should be placed on an identified consensus or lack of one;
27
 the means of determining the 
‘consensus’,28 and its source,29 which has not been confined to a comparative analysis of the 
                                                          
24
 For a very comprehensive examination based on extensive consideration of the Court’s case-law, see 
Wildhaber, Hjartarson and Donnelly, ibid. See further M. Arden Human Rights and European Law: Building 
new legal orders (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 313-315.   
25
 See eg ABC v Ireland (2011) 53 EHRR 13 at [237]. 
26
 See eg Rees v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 56 at [37]; Cossey v UK (1991) 13 EHRR 622 at [234]; Evans v UK (2007) 
43 EHRR 21 at [77]; Fretté v. France (2004) 38 EHRR 21 at [41]; ABC v Ireland (2011) 53 EHRR 13 at [232].  
27
 Wildhaber, Hjartarson and Donnelly, note 23 above, find that ‘in a sizeable number of cases the consensus 
factor has probably played a decisive role’ (at 256). But it should be noted that very strong commonality 
between laws in member states does not preclude according the state a very wide margin of appreciation in the 
context of controversial social issues as in ABC v Ireland (2011) 53 EHRR 13 in which the availability of legal 
abortion in the vast majority of member states was not found to mean that common ground existed on the 
beginning of life. In stark contrast, in Hirst v UK (no 2) (2004) 38 EHRR 40 at [81], the Court found: ‘even if no 
common European approach to the problem can be discerned, this cannot in itself be determinative of the issue’.  
28
 Research identifying a consensus is conducted for the Court by its Research Division. The research deployed 
has been criticised for its lack of thoroughness and precision compared to the consensus-based research 
conducted in respect of the US Supreme Court: see J. Brauch ‘The Dangerous Search for an Elusive Consensus: 
What the Supreme Court Should Learn from the EurCourtHR’ (2009) 52 Howard LJ 277, 278, 288; for further 
comparison between the use of consensus analysis in the United States Supreme Court and the European Court 
of Human Rights, see J.L. Murray ‘Consensus: concordance, or hegemony of the majority?’ in A. Kovler, V. 
Zagrebelsky, L. Garlicki, D. Spielmann, R. Jaeger and R. Liddell (eds) Dialogues between Judges (Strasbourg: 
European Court of Human Rights, 2008). 
29
 It has been based on discerning commonality between the laws of member states (as in the same sex marriage 
cases, below), but consensus has also been found to relate to practices in member states, common social trends 
or ongoing debates. For example, a wide margin of appreciation was conceded to France in SAS v France 
ECtHR 1 July 2014 on the basis that little common ground could be found amongst the member states as to the 
question of banning the wearing of face coverings in public since such a ban ‘has been a subject of debate in a 
number of European States’ and in some ‘is still being considered’ (at [156]). However, in terms of common 
ground as to the law in member states, only France and Belgium at the time in question had introduced such a 
ban. ABC v Ireland (note 11) also provides a good example of inconsistent application of consensus analysis. 
Soft law sources, such as reports and resolutions of the Council of Europe or the UN, have also been taken into 
account. For comprehensive examples of cases relying on these different methods of determining consensus see 
Wildhaber, Hjartarson and Donnelly, n 23 above, at 253-254 and K Dzehtsiarou European Consensus and the 
Legitimacy of the ECtHR (CUP, 2015). See also C.L. Rozakis, ‘The European Judge as Comparatist’, in B. 
Markesinis and J. Fedke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law. A new source of inspiration, (New York: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2006) 338 et seq.  
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laws of member states.
30
 More than one form of consensus may be referred to in a particular 
decision, and the precise relationship between consensus analysis and the width of the margin 
of appreciation conceded is by no means always clear.
31
 The term ‘consensus’ itself, far from 
demanding unanimity, does not necessarily denote a clear majority, and may frequently refer 
to an emerging trend.
32
 The choices available between relying on a restrictive model of the 
consensus, based on identifying a clear majority of states in favour of a particular practice 
enshrined in their laws, or on a more liberal one, based on identifying a trend, invite 
arbitrariness.
33
  
 
The laxness, imprecision and inconsistency of the Court’s consensus analysis34 is revealed 
with particular clarity in the context under discussion as this article seeks to emphasise: such 
analysis has played a significant but, in a number of respects, arbitrary, part in the 
jurisprudence bearing on same sex marriage and registered partnerships. Given that the width 
of the margin of appreciation granted is usually linked to the level of scrutiny deployed in the 
proportionality analysis, the use of consensus analysis is complicated still further in relation 
to claims of discrimination under Article 14,
35
 especially relevant in this context: if a form of 
consensus on the matter can be discerned, then it has been accepted under Article 14 that 
especially weighty reasons must be advanced,
36
 justifying the measure creating 
differentiation if certain grounds of discrimination are at stake, including sexual orientation 
and gender.
37
  
 
The role of consensus analysis in relation to Article 14 therefore arguably appears to leave 
the state at present with less leeway than it does in relation to Article 8 since if a consensus is 
found in relation to a matter falling within Article 8(1), the Court may still find that there is 
                                                          
30
 The ‘consensus’ may also relate to international law generally, to decisions of prominent Supreme Courts, 
usually the courts of  the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, South Africa: see L Wildhaber et al at 
p255 at (31), note 23 above. It may relate to a global trend, or even to an internal consensus in the state in 
question (see below, pp 00). 
31
 See pp00 below. 
32
 The uncertainty on this point has in particular been criticised by Murray, note 28 above, at 52. 
33
 See Oliari v and others v Italy ECtHR 21 July 2015 at [192]; see also pp 00 below. 
34
 See further T. Zwart as to lack of clarity in the Court’s consensus analysis: ‘More human rights than Court: 
why the legitimacy of the ECtHR is in need of repair and how it can be done’ in The ECtHR and its discontents 
(S. Flogaitis, T. Zwart, J. Fraser eds) (2013) 71-95; see also L R. Helfer, ‘Consensus, Coherence and the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (1993) 23 Cornell International Law Journal 133. 
35
 Article 14 guarantees a right to freedom from discrimination in the enjoyment of the other rights. 
36 See Karner v Austria [2004] 38 EHRR 24, at [41]. In Vrountou v Cyprus ECtHR 13 October 2015 it was 
found: ‘references to traditions, general assumptions or prevailing social attitudes in a particular country are 
insufficient justification for a difference in treatment on grounds of sex’. 
37
 See Konstantin Markin v Russia (2012) 56 EHRR 8 (GC). 
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scope for finding that the requirements denoted by ensuring ‘respect’ for private or family life 
can vary widely, as discussed below.
38
 In order to avoid reaching a particular conclusion 
unwelcome to a number of member states, the Court, in a number of the decisions considered 
below, refused to consider the claim under Article 14 at all, thereby avoiding the question of 
the weighty reasons justifying failures to introduce state recognition of same sex partnerships, 
and preferring to determine the matter instead under the banner of the varying meanings to be 
ascribed to the term ‘respect’ in Article 8(1) in relation to positive obligations. The notion of 
what is demanded by such respect is also affected by consensus-based analysis, but the 
resulting determinations have been found to leave greater latitude for varying approaches in 
member states.
39
 Criticism levelled at reliance on the consensus doctrine in general
40
 
therefore has particular pertinence in this context. While ‘universal agreement on the core 
values of the Convention system’ may provide the ‘most effective means of defending it’,41 
the divergent views in the member states as to the acceptability of religiously and culturally-
based discrimination practiced against same sex couples, means that in this context 
agreement on the meaning of the core value of promoting equality is not apparent.
42
 
 
Reserving the right to marry to different sex couples 
 
Article 12 ECHR guarantees a right to marry to ‘men and women’, but the right has been 
interpreted at Strasbourg to be inherently limited to different sex couples, even initially 
excluding couples who became different sex ones after the gender reassignment of one 
partner.
43
 The Court, however, later demonstrated, once a convergence of standards on the 
matter in Europe was perceived, its acceptance that the wording of Article 12 is open to 
interpretation in finding that post-operative transsexuals have the right to marry in the new 
assigned gender, although only if reassignment would produce a marriage of different sex 
                                                          
38
 See pp00. 
39
 See Oliari and others v Italy ECtHR 21 July 2015 at [161]; Christine Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123 at 
[72] and [85]. In both decisions it was found that there was a consensus that some form of legislation was 
necessary but in both little attempt was made to identify a consensus as to the core obligations such legislation 
should reflect. 
40
 As Macdonald argues, reliance on consensus analysis risks forfeiting the Court’s ‘aspirational role by tying 
itself to a crude, positivist conception of “standards”’: R.S. Macdonald, ‘The margin of appreciation’ in R. 
Macdonald, F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds) The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Hague: 
Martin Nijhoff, 1993) 124. 
41
 Judge Kovler, Dialogues Between Judges, note 28 above, at 13 (a Russian judge). 
42
 Benvenisti has pointed out that reliance on consensus could readily lead to failure to combat discrimination 
against minority groups: E. Benvenisti, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards’ (1999) 31 
NYU J Int L & Pol 848. 
43
 It had been found to refer to ‘traditional marriage between persons of the opposite biological sex’ (Sheffield 
and Horsham v UK (1998) 27 EHRR 163 at [66]). 
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partners.
44
 The determination to confine the right to marry to such partners arose partly on the 
basis of the original intention underlying Article 12: the right is stated to apply to ‘men and 
women’ as opposed to the use of the neutral term ‘everyone’ in Article 8.45 But even 
assuming that the words ‘men and women’ were intended to be used in an exclusionary 
fashion, that would not have been enough to exclude same sex couples from the scope of 
Article 12 since the words clearly create ambiguity:
46
 they could have been taken to mean 
merely that only men and women as opposed to children could contract marriage, arguably 
reinforcing the use of the term ‘of marriageable age’ in the Article. Clearly, the gender 
neutral term ‘adult’ could have been used instead in Article 12, but the choice of the words 
‘men and women’ is still not conclusive. They could have been interpreted as meaning that 
men could marry men or women, as could women, under an evolutive interpretation of 
Article 12, despite the fact that so doing would appear to depart from the original intention of 
the founders of the ECHR, and would not be the most apt interpretation of the words. The 
qualifying aspect of Article 12, to the effect that the right is subject to the national laws 
governing marriage,
47
 is also non-determinative, since it would be assumed, and has been 
accepted, that national laws cannot impair the very essence of the right.
48
 A breach of Article 
12 read with 14 might have been expected to arise where states allowed or mandated 
discriminatory interferences with the right to marry. 
 
Accepting state bars on same sex marriage under Article 12  
 
But the Court has consistently refused to read an obligation placed on states not to bar same 
sex marriage into Article 12, largely on the basis of reliance on a particular model of 
consensus analysis. In the leading decision in Schalk and Kopf v Austria,
49
 in which a 
registered partnership became available to the applicants as a same sex couple (less than two 
months before the Court hearing), but marriage was barred, they contended that Article 12 
should, in the light of the evolution of the concept of marriage, be read as granting same sex 
                                                          
44
 Christine Goodwin v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 123 at [100]-[104]. See in comparison Hämäläinen v Finland 
[2014] ECHR 787 (discussed below) in which the right to maintain the marriage combined with full recognition 
of the new gender of one partner was denied at Strasbourg since the ‘wrong’ gender mix was achieved after 
gender reassignment. 
45
 The neutral terms ‘one’ or ‘everyone’ are used in all the Articles bar Article 12. 
46
 That was acknowledged in Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20 at [55]. 
47
 The precise wording is: ‘according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right’.  
48
 See eg Jalloh v Germany (2007) 44 EHRR 32 at [97]; B and L v UK (2006) 42 EHRR 11 at [34]; F v 
Switzerland (1988) 10 EHRR 411 at [32]. 
49
 (2011) 53 EHRR 20. 
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couples access to marriage.
50
 The Court found, outside the context of gender reassignment, 
that it no longer considered that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all 
circumstances be limited to marriage between two people of different genders.
51
 Thus, having 
taken the step previously of finding that the birth gender of one member of a married couple 
was not necessarily determinative of the applicability of Article 12 if that gender had been 
reassigned to create a different sex couple, it contemplated the further step of finding that two 
persons of the same gender could fall within its scope.
52
 In so finding the Court took account 
of Article 9 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
53
 which, as the Court had noted in 
Goodwin,
54
 had deliberately dropped the reference to ‘men and women’. But it also noted that 
by referring to national law, Article 9 of the Charter had left the decision whether or not to 
allow same sex marriage to the member states,
55
 and thereby had left leeway for the 
Strasbourg Court to resist the claim.  
 
Rather than merely relying on the words ‘men and women’ in Article 12, as it had previously 
done, or simply on the specific national law governing marriage, it found that marriage has 
‘deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ largely from one society to 
another’,56 and in finding no breach of Article 12, the Court proceeded to rely on 
numerically-based comparative consensus analysis to find that a particularly wide margin of 
appreciation should be accorded to Austria, given that only six out of forty-seven Council of 
Europe States allowed same sex marriage at the time.
57
 So the decision whether to allow 
same sex couples access to marriage was found to remain a matter for the national laws of 
contracting member states within a wide margin of appreciation. The tone adopted by the 
Grand Chamber in Hämäläinen v Finland
58
 in relation to Article 12 was even less propitious 
                                                          
50
 Ibid at [44]. 
51
 Ibid at [61]; it found: ‘the Court ‘no longer consider[s] that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in 
all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex’. 
52
 Had it done so that would clearly also have benefited couples wishing to marry who became same sex after 
the gender reassignment of one member of the couple: see Hämäläinen v Finland [2014] ECHR 787, below pp 
00.  
53
 The Court noted in Schalk and Kopf (2011) 53 EHRR 20 at [24]-[26], that the Commentary of the Charter, 
which became legally binding in December 2009, had confirmed that Article 9 is meant to be broader in scope 
than the corresponding Articles in other human rights instruments: Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (2000/C 364/01). 
54
 Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 447 at [100]. 
55
 In Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20 the Court referred to the words of the Commentary, at [25]: 
‘... it may be argued that there is no obstacle to recognise same-sex relationships in the context of marriage. 
There is, however, no explicit requirement that domestic laws should facilitate such marriages.’ 
56
 Ibid [61]. 
57
 Ibid [58].  
58
 [2014] ECHR 787. 
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in the sense of indicating a willingness to reopen the question once the European consensus 
on same sex marriage had strengthened. The case concerned a married couple whose 
marriage pre-dated the gender reassignment of one member of the couple. Confirmation of 
the applicant’s status as a female required under the Finnish legislation that her spouse had 
given consent to the conversion of their marriage (viewed by a majority of the Court as 
having become a same sex marriage) into a registered partnership, but both partners were 
strongly opposed to such conversion on the grounds of religious belief. She claimed under 
Article 12 read with 14 that she should be able to remain married with full recognition of her 
new gender, regardless of the fact that the marriage would no longer be one between different 
sex partners.  
 
The Court refused to consider the case separately under Article 12, merely reiterating its 
finding in Schalk and Kopf that the Article could not be construed as imposing an obligation 
on the Contracting States to grant access to marriage to same sex couples.
59
 That stance was 
reaffirmed, but even more strongly, in Oliari and others v Italy,
60
 a case brought by three 
same sex couples who could not fall back on entering a registered partnership since no such 
option was open to them in Italy. They argued, as did the applicants in Obergefell, that 
denying them access to marriage meant that they were marginalised and stigmatised as part of 
a sexual minority.
61
 The Court noted that since Schalk and Kopf there had been a ‘gradual 
evolution’ of the consensus62 on the matter since eleven member states had introduced same 
sex marriage by mid-2015. But the Court clearly considered that such evolution did not 
change its stance on the European consensus, which was found to mean, without referring to 
states’ margin of appreciation, that Article 12 did not impose an obligation on the respondent 
Government to grant same sex couples access to marriage.
63
 Not only was the Article 12 
claim rapidly dismissed, it was found to be inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded – a clear 
signal to the member states that since Schalk and Kopf the Court has become more, not less, 
opposed to recognising a right of same sex couples to marry at the present time, despite the 
evolution on the matter occurring in Europe.     
 
                                                          
59
 Ibid [96]. For discussion see P. Johnson ‘”The choice of wording must be regarded as deliberate": same-sex 
marriage and Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights' (2015) 40(2) European Law Review 
207-224, and Homosexuality and the ECtHR (2013), at 151-160. 
60
 ECtHR 21
 
July 2015. 
61
 Ibid [190]. 
62
 Ibid [192]. 
63
 Ibid [192]. 
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Rejecting a right to same sex marriage deriving from Articles 8 and 14  
 
Arguments were also raised by the applicants in Schalk and Kopf and Hämäläinen to the 
effect that a right to same sex marriage could be derived from Article 8 read with 14.
64
 When 
the Court in Schalk and Kopf turned to the question of recognising such a right, it reiterated 
the established acceptance that differences created within the scope of Article 8 by the state 
based on sexual orientation require a serious justification under Article 14. But on the basis of 
the concession considered above of a wide margin of appreciation to the state, due to lack of 
consensus as to acceptance of same sex marriage in Europe, the Court did not scrutinise the 
justification for excluding same sex couples from marriage. It merely found that Article 14 
taken in conjunction with Article 8, a provision of more general purpose and scope than 
Article 12, could not be interpreted as imposing such an obligation either.
65
 The similar 
argument in Hämäläinen was also dismissed briefly on the basis that the applicant’s situation 
and the situations of persons born into their current gender were viewed as insufficiently 
similar to be compared with each other,
66
 although no reasons were given for that finding, 
meaning that the Article 14 claim failed at the first stage. The majority judges characterised 
the claim as one involving the imposition of positive obligations under Article 8
67
 on the state 
to secure the right to effective respect for citizens’ physical and psychological integrity. Since 
it again found no European consensus on allowing same sex marriages,
68
 it was determined 
that the margin of appreciation to be afforded to Finland would remain a wide one, and that 
Finland had not over-stepped it.
69
  
 
Failing to perceive discrimination  
 
The applicants in Oliari did not argue for a right to marry under Article 8 read with 14 but 
sought to rely on Article 12 read with 14; that claim was also dismissed briefly on the basis 
                                                          
64
 Article 8 guarantees a right to respect for private and family life, and the home, qualified in Article 8(2). 
65
 Ibid [101].  
66
 Ibid [111].   
67
 It reiterated that such obligations had been accepted as arising under Article 8 in: Nitecki v Poland ECtHR 21 
March 2002; Sentges v Netherlands ECtHR 8 July 2003; Odièvre v France (2004) 38 EHRR 43; Glass v UK 
[2004] 1 FCR 553 at [74]-[83]; and Pentiacova and Others v Moldova (2005) (admissibility decision) 40 EHRR 
SE23. 
68
 Hämäläinen v Finland [2014] ECHR 787 at [73]-[74]. That lack of consensus would have been non-
determinative following the reasoning of the Dissenting Opinion which argued for a ‘trans exception’ to the ban 
on same sex marriage on the basis that the state should differentiate between the applicant’s situation and that of 
a homosexual couple (para 20 of the Opinion); the majority did not accept that possibility (para 70).  
69
 Ibid [67]; the Grand Chamber referred to its judgment in X, Y and Z v UK ECtHR 22 April 1997 at [44].  
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that if in Schalk and Kopf a right to same sex marriage could not be derived from Article 8 
read with 14 on the basis of its more general purpose, the same could be said under Articles 
12 and 14. That analogy was not substantiated, and appeared to confuse the scope of Article 8 
with that of Article 14. The point raised by the applicants in Oliari was that there should be 
no discrimination in the exercise of a specific right, the right to marry, an argument that could 
readily be distinguished from seeking to derive that right from a general right to non-
discrimination in according respect to family life. Nevertheless, the Court not only relied on 
that doubtful analogy, but dismissed that part of the claim also as manifestly ill-founded, 
exhibiting a particularly clear failure to follow a transparent reasoning process.  
 
The applicants in both Schalk and Kopf and Hämäläinen raised the issue of differences 
between a marriage and a registered partnership, arguing that such partnerships did not 
provide the same level of civic benefits and recognition as did marriage. That argument was 
rejected on the basis that in both member states registered partnerships offered an acceptable 
level of protection which was found to be within the states’ margin of appreciation. The 
refusal to allow the applicant both full recognition of her new gender and maintenance of her 
marriage was found to be justified in Hämäläinen: the differences between a marriage and a 
registered partnership were found not to be such as to involve an essential change in the 
applicant’s legal situation.70 She would have, it was found, broadly the same legal protection 
under a registered partnership as was afforded by marriage. The Grand Chamber therefore 
concluded that the demands of proportionality and of ‘fair balance’ were satisfied under 
Article 8(2).
71
  
 
Arbitrary use of consensus analysis  
 
A clear movement in Oliari away from the Strasbourg stance in Schalk and Kopf, which 
implied that there was a certain receptivity to recognising same sex marriage in future under 
Article 12, is apparent. Schalk and Kopf appeared to open the way to recognition of a right to 
same sex marriage under Article 12 in future.
72
 Given that in Hämäläinen and Oliari the 
Court merely relied on Schalk and Kopf in refusing to give consideration to the question of 
the application of Article 12 to same sex couples, Schalk remains the authoritative decision, 
                                                          
70
 Hämäläinen v Finland [2014] ECHR 787 at [83]. 
71
 Ibid [88]. 
72
 Schalk and Kopf at [61]. 
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but the decisions taken together indicate that there is a mounting reluctance at Strasbourg to 
confront the application of Article 12 to same sex marriage at present, a reluctance which its 
choice of model of consensus analysis has obscured to an extent.  
 
The finding in Oliari that the Article 12 claim was inadmissible despite the movement 
towards a consensus on same sex marriage that had occurred since Schalk and Kopf, 
indicated that the Court had in effect made a policy decision not to jeopardise its own 
position by espousing same sex marriage, in contrast to the stance of the US Supreme 
Court,
73
 and was seeking as far as possible to deter future same sex couple claimants from 
bringing claims under Article 12 until the consensus had strengthened further. Its refusal to 
rely on a trend as a form of consensus may also have been intended to indicate that it was 
offering in effect a political quid pro quo to a number of governments, given that the Court 
did find a breach of Article 8, as discussed below, in respect of the lack of a registered 
partnership scheme for same sex couples. Reliance on that model of the consensus under 
Article 12 means that its approach can be contrasted with other decisions in the context of 
same sex unions which have relied on discerning a trend alone where an intimate aspect of 
private life is at stake.
74
 Vallianatos v Greece
75
 in particular relied on identifying a trend 
towards introducing same sex registered partnerships, while in X and others v Austria
76
 the 
majority found that there had been a breach of Article 8 read with 14 due to the state’s refusal 
to allow second parent adoption where that parent was in a same sex relationship, relying as a 
basis for comparison only on the ten Council of Europe member States which allowed 
second-parent adoption in unmarried couples. The dissenters considered that the majority had 
overstepped the limits of evolutive interpretation.
77
  
 
As a result of its choice of model of consensus analysis in these decisions the Court avoided 
considering why national laws excluding adults from marriage on the basis of a protected 
                                                          
73
 See Obergefell v Hodges 576 US (2015) June 26 at 28: ‘There is dignity in the bond between two men or two 
women who seek to marry…Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of 
civilization’s oldest institutions.’ 
74
 The joint dissenting Opinions in Hämäläinen, relying on SH and others v Austria (2011), 52 EHRR 6 found at 
[94]: ‘the existence of a consensus is not the only factor that influences the width of the State’s margin of 
appreciation: that same margin is restricted where “…a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence 
or identity is at stake”’. See also in a different context the comments of the Court in Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 
EHRR 447 at [85]; in Goodwin itself a clear consensus was apparent, at least with regard to Article 8, and a thin 
majority in relation to Article 12. 
75
 (2014) 59 EHRR 12.  
76
 (2013) 57 EHRR 14. 
77
 See the joint partly dissenting opinions of Judges Casadevall, Ziemele, Kovler, Jočienė, Šikuta, De Gaetano 
and Sicilianos. 
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characteristic
78
 were not viewed as impairing the very essence of the right,
79
 despite its 
previous findings to the effect that the discretion accorded to states as to the nature of their 
national laws on marriage could not go so far as to impair that essence. The discussion in 
Oliari, which gave an appearance of specifically confronting the issue of discrimination 
under Article 12 read with 14, in fact failed even more signally than had the findings in the 
previous two decisions to acknowledge the discriminatory impact of the policy against same 
sex marriage in Italy.
80
 As mentioned, a number of Central and Eastern European states 
appear to be adamantly opposed to the introduction of same sex marriage, and in a number of 
instances it is constitutionally barred.
81
 In an apparent effort to avoid confronting the 
problems the stance of those states create in terms of maintaining its own authority, while still 
encouraging states to provide a measure of protection for same sex couples, the Court has 
made some tentative moves towards accepting a right to a registered partnership rather than 
marriage under Article 8, either read with Article 14, or alone, the issue to which this article 
now turns.  
 
Recognition of same sex partnerships as ‘families’ under Article 8    
 
Before the question of state formalisation of their unions could be considered, it was 
necessary for the Court to recognise same sex partners as ‘families’ under Article 8(1). In 
contrast to different sex unmarried partners,
82
 same sex partners did not receive such 
recognition until recently. But as same sex couples in Europe increasingly sought recognition 
and protection of their relationships, a number of them turned to Article 8 read with Article 
14 at Strasbourg, arguing that the state is under an obligation stemming from Article 14 to 
avoid discrimination within the scope of respect for family life under Article 8(1). The 
decision in Karner relied on Article 14 read with 8 to find that same sex couples have a right 
to respect for their home, on the basis that the state had failed to show under Article 14 that it 
was necessary in order to achieve the aim of protecting the traditional family to exclude same 
                                                          
78
 As mentioned (see note 37 above) differentiation on certain protected grounds, which include sexual 
orientation, requires particularly weighty justification under Article 14: see Karner v Austria (note 36) at [41];  
Hämäläinen v Finland [2014] ECHR 787 at [109]; Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493 at [89], [94]. 
79
 In Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20 at [51] the Court merely adverted to the attachment to the 
‘traditional concept of marriage’ as underpinning Article 12. 
80
 Oliari v Italy ECtHR 21
 
July 2015 at [189], [192]-[194]. 
81
 See note 159. 
82
 See X and Y v UK Eur Com 3 May 1983. 
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sex couples from such protection under the Austrian Rent Act.
83
 Karner thus aided in paving 
the way for the significant decision in Schalk and Kopf which, while refusing to find a breach 
of Article 12, as discussed, recognised same sex couples as ‘families’ under Article 8(1) for 
the first time.  
 
The Court noted in Schalk and Kopf that so far its case-law under Article 8 had only accepted 
that the ‘emotional and sexual relationship’ of a same-sex couple constitutes ‘private life’, 
but it had not found that it would constitute ‘family life’.84 But given that recently a rapid 
evolution of social attitudes towards same sex couples and of the concept of ‘family’ in 
member states had occurred, and bearing certain EU Directives relating to the family in mind, 
the Court found that the ‘relationship of the applicants, as a cohabiting same sex couple living 
in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of ‘family life’, just as the relationship 
of a different-sex couple in the same situation would’.85 So it found that the applicant couple 
was in a relevantly similar situation to a different-sex couple as regards their need for ‘legal 
recognition and protection of their relationship.’86 Schalk and Kopf therefore opened the door 
to imposing a duty on Council of Europe member states to provide some protection for the 
family life of same sex couples under Article 8 read with 14, paving the way for the later 
decision in Oliari.  
 
An ECHR right to access a same sex registered partnership?   
 
The jurisprudence considered reflects and forms part of the pressure to introduce state 
recognition for same sex relationships emanating from international human rights law more 
generally. In particular, a 2015 UN Human Rights Report made a number of 
recommendations to national governments on LGBT rights, including a recommendation to 
legally recognize same sex relationships.
87
 Under EU law the core principle of freedom of 
movement may be undermined if there is a failure to maintain the rights granted to a same 
sex couple in one state if they move to another EU state,
88
 regardless of local laws. The 
                                                          
83
 Karner v Austria [2004] 38 EHRR 24, at [41]. See also Kozak v Poland Application no 13102/02, judgment of 
2 March 2010 which applied Karner to a similar housing tenancy situation in Poland. 
84
 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20 at [90]. 
85
 Ibid at [94]. The Court referenced (para 26) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 
29 April 2004, Article 2 and European Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003, Article 4. 
86
 Ibid at [99]. That was confirmed by the Grand Chamber in X v Austria (2013) 57 EHRR. 
87
 UN Human Rights Office Report (OHCHR) (A/HRC/29/23). 
88
 This view was put forward recently by Frans Timmermans, the Vice President of the European Commission; 
(see the Telegraph 30 June 2015, report by M Holehouse from Brussels). The problem as regards freedom of 
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Council of Europe has also encouraged states to introduce a statutory framework providing 
recognition and protection for same sex relationships: a 2010 resolution of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe recognized the importance of granting same sex couples 
the same rights as different sex couples in civil unions or registered partnerships.
89
 Partly on 
that basis, in 2014 the Council of Europe’s advisory body – the European Commission for 
Democracy through Law – criticized the scope of an amendment proposed by Macedonia to 
its Constitution barring same sex couples from entering registered partnerships,
90
 on the 
grounds that ‘it should not exclude providing to same-sex couples the same level of legal 
recognition as it provides to different-sex couples.’ The other part of the amendment, barring 
same sex marriage, was not subject to the same criticism, on the basis of the decisions in 
Schalk and Kopf and Hämäläinen.  
That general encouragement to introduce same sex registered partnerships, combined with the 
current determination at Strasbourg to avoid finding a breach of Article 12 in respect of state 
bars on same sex marriage, appears to have fuelled an acceptance instead of a movement 
towards declaring a right to a registered partnership under Article 8 alone or read with 14, 
currently culminating in the decision in Oliari. It was clearly unnecessary to declare such a 
right in Schalk and Kopf and Hämäläinen on the facts, but the Court addressed that point 
expressly in Schalk and Kopf, finding that since the applicants could enter such a partnership 
the majority found no need to decide that lack of any means of state recognition and 
protection for same sex couples in the form of a specific statutory framework would create a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
movement clearly does not affect Council of Europe states not yet members of the EU, so it most obviously 
affects Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Latvia (and at present Italy) as EU 
member states since they do not recognise same sex unions. It also affects EU states that provide forms of 
registered partnership affording significantly less protection than marriage in comparison with ‘stronger’ forms; 
Germany’s registered partnership scheme, for example, provides considerably more protection for same sex 
couples than does France’s Civil Solidarity Pact scheme. So a same sex couple in a German registered 
partnership would be disadvantaged if they moved to France. See further on these points Confronting 
Homophobia in Europe: Social and Legal Perspectives L. Trappolin, A. Gasparini, R. Wintemute (eds) 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011). This issue from the perspective of Articles 8 and 12 ECHR is likely to come 
before the Strasbourg Court soon: Orlandi v Italy (App no 26431/12) concerns lack of Italian recognition of a 
same sex union contracted in another state. Two of the couples concerned had contracted marriages in EU 
member states  in which same sex marriage was legal, but Italy had refused to recognise their marriages, leading 
to various forms of civic disadvantage. The other couples raise the issue of recognition in Italy of marriages 
conducted in a non-EU member state. All the applicants complain that they are being discriminated against, in 
ECHR terms on the basis of their sexual orientation. They complain specifically about the authorities’ refusal to 
register their marriage contracted abroad and more generally about the impossibility of obtaining recognition of 
their relationships in Italy. They invoke Articles 8, 12 and 14. 
89
 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5. 
90
 Draft Amendment XXXIII to the Macedonian Constitution introduced a constitutional definition of marriage 
as a union solely between a woman and a man. It also introduced a constitutional definition of ‘registered 
cohabitation’ or any other form of ‘registered life partnership’ as a ‘life union solely between one woman and 
one man’: Strasbourg, 13 October 2014 Opinion N° 779 / 2014 CDL-AD(2014)026, Or. Eng., para 98(a). 
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violation of Article 8 read with 14.
91
 Following that significant finding in Schalk, it was 
always probable that the Court would be confronted with claims that a breach of Article 8 
alone or read with 14 would arise if a state did not provide same sex couples with any 
framework providing such protection.  
Discriminatory exclusion from an existing registered partnership scheme 
A statutory framework creating registered partnerships can provide state recognition and 
protection of a relationship which includes defining the rights and responsibilities of the 
couple on a range of matters, including: property; access to pension rights; inheritance; in 
relation to children. Not only is civic disadvantage clearly suffered by same sex couples who 
cannot access any form of statutory framework offering civic benefits broadly comparable to 
those offered by contracting marriage, but the dignity of homosexuals as a group is assailed if 
the choice of such recognition is denied.
92
 The question of the duty of a state to allow same 
sex couples access to a form of registered partnership where they were excluded from that 
scheme and also from accessing marriage – was raised in Vallianatos v Greece.93 Obviously 
the couples in Vallianatos were in a situation of greater disadvantage than that of the couple 
in Schalk and Kopf, who could access a registered partnership: Greece had introduced civil 
unions, but they were designed only for different sex couples. The applicant couples, who 
were in stable same sex relationships, challenged their exclusion from such unions under 
Article 8 read with 14. The Court found that the applicants’ relationships would fall within 
the notions of both ‘private’ and ‘family’ life under Article 8(1), and found that Article 14 
applied
94
 since the applicants were in a comparable situation to different sex couples as 
regards ‘their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship’ – as established 
in Schalk and Kopf.
95
 The Court also gave a brief nod to the dignity-based argument in 
finding that formal civil unions have an ‘intrinsic value’ for persons in the applicants’ 
position, even regardless of the legal effects they produce.
96
  
 
The law in Greece clearly created a difference in treatment based on the sexual orientation of 
the persons concerned, and the Court was not convinced by the aim of the policy, of 
                                                          
91
 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20 at [103]. 
92
 See the discussion of this point in Obergefell v Hodges 576 US (2015) June 26, note 73 above. See also note 
19 as to the issue of choice of marriage as the means of formalising the relationship. 
93
 (2014) 59 EHRR 12.  
94
 Ibid [73] and [74]. 
95
 Ibid [78]; see the findings in Schalk and Kopf (2011) 53 EHRR 20 at [99]. 
96
 Ibid [81]. That point was reiterated in Oliari v Italy ECtHR 21
 
July 2015: see text to note 115 below. 
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protecting the family in the traditional sense, terming it ‘rather abstract’.97 Its analysis of the 
European consensus found that an evolving or ‘minority’ consensus was currently emerging 
with regard to the introduction of forms of legal recognition of same sex relationships, in the 
sense that where contracting states did authorise a form of registered partnership other than 
marriage only two states had reserved it exclusively to different-sex couples.
98
 On the other 
hand, such partnerships were not yet established in the majority of states. Nevertheless, in 
assessing the proportionality of the means chosen with the aims pursued, the Court conceded 
a narrow margin of appreciation only to the state, given that the differentiation in question 
was based on sexual orientation. On that basis proportionality demands under Article 14 were 
not found to require merely that the measure chosen was in principle suitable to achieve the 
aim in question: it also had to be shown to be necessary to achieve that aim to exclude same 
sex couples from the category of civil unions.  
 
On that basis the Court found that the government’s arguments failed to justify the difference 
in treatment arising out of the legislation in question between same sex and different sex 
couples. So a violation of Article 14 read with 8 was found, meaning that in general failure to 
provide same sex couples with access to an existing registered partnership scheme in a state, 
combined with the non-availability of marriage, potentially places a state in violation of the 
ECHR on the ground that among the choices available to a state in terms of protecting 
relationships, provision of no formal recognition has a disproportionately adverse impact on 
applicants. The decision in Hämäläinen offers some indirect support to that contention since 
the key point that emerges is that had no registered partnership been available as an 
alternative to marriage, Finland would probably have been found, possibly even under less 
strict scrutiny, to have breached Article 8 on grounds of disproportionality, on the basis that 
the applicant would have been in a position whereby she could obtain no state recognition of 
her relationship, while at the same time achieving full confirmation of her post-operative 
gender. Since in Hämäläinen a formalised union was available to the couple in question, the 
demands of proportionality were found to be satisfied.
99
  
 
                                                          
97
 Ibid [84]. That point had previously been made in Karner v Austria at [41]. 
98
 Ibid [91] and [92]. 19 states (the minority) at that point had introduced such forms of registered partnership. 
99
 That also may have been the basis (no reasons were given) for declaring the application in Ferguson & Ors v 
United Kingdom (App no 8254/11), the ‘Equal Love’ case, inadmissible: the heterosexual couples involved 
could access marriage; the homosexual couples could access civil partnerships. The couples wanted to have the 
choice of accessing either marriage or a civil partnership, rather than being confined to one form of state 
recognition of the relationship, based on their sexual orientation.    
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Lack of access to any form of same sex registered partnership 
 
That stance, in relation to providing access to an existing partnership scheme, indicated that 
disproportionality might also arise where no such scheme was available, the situation that 
arose in Oliari and others v Italy.
100
 The Court was confronted with a situation resembling 
that in Vallianatos but in which no registered partnership scheme had been introduced, even 
for different sex couples. The only form of state recognition of relationships available in Italy 
offering legal recognition and civic benefits targeted at couples was marriage, from which 
same sex couples were excluded. The Court had to determine whether Italy had therefore 
failed to comply with a positive obligation to ensure respect for the applicants’ private and 
family life, in particular through the provision of a legal framework allowing them to have 
their relationships recognised and protected under domestic law. The protection related, the 
Court found, to central, not peripheral, needs of the applicants.
101
   
 
The Court viewed the notion of ‘respect’ for private and family life under Article 8(1) as a 
flexible one, especially in relation to the imposition of a positive obligation to introduce a 
new legislative framework. It found that, having regard to the diversity of the practices 
followed in the member states, the requirements denoted by the term ‘respect’ would vary 
considerably from case to case. But it identified certain relevant factors which would in 
principle relate to the assessment: ‘the impact on an applicant of a situation where there is 
discordance between social reality and the law’, and the nature of the relevant administrative 
and legal practices within the domestic system.
102
 The Court found that the current available 
protection in Italy for same sex couples in the form of ‘cohabitation agreements’ did not 
provide for the core needs of a couple in a stable, committed relationship, and also that such 
agreements were designed only to provide certain rights to people who lived together, 
including flatmates, and were not intended explicitly to provide any legal rights aimed at 
couples.
103
 Recognition of same sex unions was available but only in a minority of existing 
municipalities,
104
 and was in any event only of symbolic value. Also those arrangements were 
not deemed to be sufficiently stable, partly due to the nature of the judicial approach in Italy, 
which meant that couples seeking the protection of the courts would be dealt with on a case 
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by case basis only, creating uncertainty.
105
 The Italian courts had found on such a basis that 
same sex unions should be protected as a form of social community under article 2 of the 
Italian Constitution, but that it was the role of the legislature to introduce a form of legal 
partnership covering such couples, not of the judiciary. The Court further found in relation to 
Italy’s positive obligations under Article 8 that there was ‘a conflict between the social reality 
of the applicants, who for the most part live their relationship openly in Italy, and the law, 
which gives them no official recognition’.106 The detrimental impact on the applicant couples 
was viewed by the Court as ‘momentous’.107  
 
The Court reiterated that where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or 
identity was at stake the margin of appreciation conceded to the state in question would be 
restricted,
108
 but where there was no consensus within the member states as to the ‘relative 
importance’ of such a facet or as to the most effective method of protecting it, especially 
where ‘sensitive moral or ethical issues’ were at stake, the margin would be wider.109 In 
terms of consensus analysis, the Court, in a somewhat opaque paragraph, referred to a ‘thin 
majority’ of member states (twenty-four out of forty-seven) that had by 2015 already 
legislated to introduce forms of same sex registered partnership;
110
 it also referred to the 
global trend towards such introduction.
111
 Displaying a degree of boldness, the Court did not 
find that since no strong consensus on the availability of registered partnerships was apparent 
in the member states, a wide margin of appreciation should be conceded to the state. Had it 
done so that would have meant that the reasons for Italy’s failure to satisfy its positive 
obligations would not have been closely scrutinised. The Court could have waited for a 
stronger consensus in order to find a violation in respect of a failure by a state to introduce a 
same sex registered partnership scheme. The finding on consensus influenced the Court’s 
margin of appreciation analysis, but the precise impact of the consensus was not articulated: 
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it can only be assumed that there was an implicit acceptance that since an emerging European 
and global consensus on the matter was apparent, the margin conceded to Italy should be 
narrow. 
 
In considering any justification for the failure to introduce a specific legal framework 
covering same sex couples, the Court noted that the Italian Government had failed to 
highlight explicitly what, in its view, corresponded to the interests of the community as a 
whole, which might have had to be balanced against the rights of the couples in question. The 
Italian government strongly denied that the absence of such a framework was intended to 
protect the traditional concept of family, or the morals of society under Article 8(2). It argued 
instead that time was needed to achieve a ‘gradual maturation of a common view of the 
national community’ in recognising ‘this new form of family’,112 and referred to varying 
views on this very sensitive social issue which it viewed itself as best placed to address.
113
 So 
it merely relied on its margin of appreciation as regards the choice of timing and the nature of 
the framework to be introduced. But the Court impliedly found that the margin would not 
cover the position, given that the Italian Constitutional Court had repeatedly called for a 
juridical recognition of the relevant rights and duties of homosexual unions, but the 
government had not responded;
114
 thus it concluded that the Italian government had 
overstepped its margin of appreciation and failed to fulfil the positive obligation in question. 
 
If the Court has now therefore recognised, albeit tentatively, a right to a registered partnership 
for same sex couples, the content of such a right requires some consideration. Oliari had very 
little to say on what the scope of a right to a registered partnership under Article 8 would 
entail in terms of the level of civic benefits and of recognition it would need to deliver. As 
understood at Strasbourg in the jurisprudence considered, especially Hämäläinen, it appears 
to be a right to official recognition of the relationship that provides a certain level of 
protection for it in terms of enjoying civic benefits (in relation, in particular, to pension 
rights, housing tenancy rights, inheritance). The Court in Oliari merely spoke of ‘the core 
rights relevant to a couple in a stable and committed relationship’ and found ‘such civil 
partnerships have an intrinsic value for persons in the applicants’ position, irrespective of the 
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legal effects, however narrow or extensive, that they would produce’.115 Thus if the level 
attained by a particular legal framework were to be significantly different from that available 
under a marriage, or if a same sex couple moved from one member state to another offering a 
lower level of benefits, then it is not clearly apparent at present that Article 8, possibly read 
with 14, would be breached, despite the fact that the detriment would arise on grounds of 
sexual orientation. It appears that until the consensus on the need for comparability between 
registered partnerships and marriage strengthens, the level of benefits under the current 
Strasbourg approach could depart quite significantly from those available via marriage.
116
  
 
An Article 8 right to a same sex registered partnership? 
 
While a right to a registered partnership for same sex unions under Article 8 was declared in 
Oliari, its scope was accorded fluidity by reference to two key factors specific to Italy: a 
discordance between the law and the social acceptance of same sex partnerships, and the 
unheeded attempts of the highest judicial authorities to persuade the legislature of the need 
for state recognition and protection of such partnerships. Reference to those factors could be 
taken to imply that the demands of respect for the family life of same sex couples, in terms of 
requiring the introduction of a registered partnership scheme, would bear some relation to the 
presence of those factors in a particular state. That stance stands in contrast to the one taken 
in Vallianatos since in that instance (unsurprisingly) no such factors were referred to in 
respect of imposing a positive obligation to end the exclusion of such couples from an 
existing scheme. The first factor in particular relates in effect to identifying an internal 
consensus on this issue in Italy. Thus in effect three forms of consensus analysis were 
referred to as influencing the Oliari judgment, and the need for a consensus in a single state 
could potentially counter the impact the other two forms could have in future as the European 
and global consensus on provision of specific legal frameworks for same sex unions 
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continues to strengthen.
117
 One possible underlying explanation of that reluctance to commit 
the majority to acceptance of a right to a registered partnership under Article 8, it is 
contended, may have been concern as to the reception of such a right in certain Eastern and 
Central European member states, given their stances as to registered partnerships and same 
sex marriage.
118
 
  
It may be noted that the concurring Opinion in Oliari was even more determined than the 
majority one to avoid finding that a right to a same sex registered partnership had been 
declared.
119
 The Opinion found that the only basis for the decision was the involvement of the 
state in relation to the situation of the couple: ‘the Italian State has chosen, through its highest 
courts, notably the Constitutional Court, to declare that two people of the same sex living in 
stable cohabitation are invested by the Italian Constitution with a fundamental right to obtain 
juridical recognition of the relevant rights and duties attaching to their union’. Thus, it relied 
on the Italian approach to the legal recognition of same sex partnerships, not the ECHR one, 
and made it clear that the minority judges’ reasoning would apply only to Italy, not to the 
other twenty-two states without a specific legal framework for same sex couples.  
 
Re-envisaging consensus analysis in this context 
 
Oliari reveals with particular clarity that the choice of model of consensus being relied on, 
and its relation to the issues before the Court, requires clarification in general. But the 
departure from the recognised models of consensus analysis arguably implicit in placing 
reliance in effect on a consensus discerned in a single state is especially problematic. It is 
argued that instead the Court, in a social context of this nature, could take account of such 
acceptance in broadly comparable states, as a significant, but not solely determinative, aspect 
of the general European consensus. Since this issue relates to a division between Western 
European states and a number of Central and Eastern European states, the varying intensity of 
trends towards the consolidation of democracy and of the values of tolerance and acceptance 
of diversity in the latter group of states renders reliance on comparability particularly 
pertinent. Clearly, placing some reliance on such a consensus would appear at first glance to 
be more likely to slow down the pace of change in this context than would relying on the 
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general European consensus but, perhaps paradoxically, so doing might encourage the Court 
to take a more proactive approach since any underlying concerns judges might have as to the 
reception of their judgments in certain states might be allayed to an extent. Placing some 
emphasis on the consensus on this issue in broadly comparable states, as opposed to 
discerning one in a single state, would foster a gradualist approach to eroding discrimination 
against same sex couples in a number of member states, as considered further below.
120
 So 
doing could also aid in avoiding the perception that the Court in the particularly sensitive 
social context of requiring the introduction of same sex registered partnerships could merely 
rely on a consensus to impose ‘Western’ human rights’ standards on Central and Eastern 
European member states.
121
 In general, clearly, the Court should give the ECHR the same 
‘meaning’ in all 47 member states, but the malleability of consensus analysis enhances the 
fluidity of its ‘meaning’ or scope in relation to positive obligations. 
 
Disregarding the discriminatory dimension of the claim  
 
It is significant that the Court declined to decide Oliari separately under Article 14 read with 
8.
122
 Had it done so, the two factors it identified as related to the demands of respecting the 
family life of same sex couples would have been found to be irrelevant under Article 14, 
bearing in mind that no justification was put forward for the differentiation created in the 
circumstances between same sex and different sex couples in terms of official recognition 
and protection for their relationships. Given the findings on the European and global 
consensus, it would have appeared that weighty reasons would probably have been required 
to create such justification, which could not have been put forward. But the Court avoided 
that result by refusing to accord any role to Article 14 – which also allowed it to avoid 
deciding whether the absence of a specific legal framework amounted to direct or indirect 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 
 
As indicated, Italy in Oliari refused adamantly to put forward the justification that the lack of 
protection for same sex unions was based on the need to protect ‘traditional’ marriage; its 
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stance stands in strong contrast to that of a number of states which, as mentioned, have 
recently introduced into their constitutions measures clearly aimed at rendering state 
recognition of same sex marriage unconstitutional,
123
 in some instances linked expressly to 
protection of marriage and the family.
124
 If a case analogous to Oliari arises in future, but the 
state argues that non-introduction of a registered partnerships scheme covering same sex 
couples is needed in order to protect ‘traditional’ families,125 as Greece argued in Vallianatos, 
it would not need to be shown that such non-introduction was strictly necessary to achieve 
that end,
126
 assuming that the Court again refused to consider Article 14 read with 8. While 
that argument would be unable to sustain intensive scrutiny under Article 14, it has in effect 
been allowed instead in Oliari (although the Court could incorporate that test into its 
reasoning under Article 8 in future) to narrow the scope of Article 8(1). 
 
Implications for member states lacking a specific legal framework for same sex unions 
 
Possible disincentives affecting some potential Central and Eastern European applicants 
 
The decisions in Schalk and Kopf and Oliari are not of the most crucial significance for 
Western European states
127
 since all such states already provide, or are about to provide, a 
specific statutory framework in the form of registered partnerships and/or marriage for same 
sex couples.
128
 So far, no claim broadly analogous to those in Schalk and Kopf, Oliari or 
Vallianatos has been brought from any Central or Eastern European state providing no 
specific framework creating protection for same sex unions,
129
 even from the less socially 
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conservative ones. But unless a successful application based on Oliari is brought from such a 
state some years in the future, it will not directly come into confrontation with the ECHR 
enforcement mechanisms, such as they are, if it disregards the decision in Oliari.
130
 There are 
a range of reasons why such an application is in any event at present fairly unlikely from the 
more socially conservative member states (although clearly it cannot be ruled out), and if 
brought might fail. Oliari affirms an already discernible tendency in the Court’s judgments – 
to depart via European consensus analysis from the principle of upholding core standards 
uniformly across Europe. But, as discussed, Oliari went further: in speaking of the 
discordance between social and legal reality in Italy, the Court was clearly referring to the 
established acceptance of same sex unions in that particular state. Such a discordance would 
be unlikely to be discerned in a number of Central and Eastern European states where it 
would be much harder for a same sex partnership to live openly as a couple, and where a 
much higher percentage of the population is opposed to recognition of same sex unions than 
in Italy. Further, the higher courts in certain of such states would be less likely to call for the 
introduction of registered partnerships for same sex couples.
131
  
 
If an application was brought in the near future against a state in which the first (internal 
consensus) or both of the factors identified in Oliari was not present, then the Court would, it 
appears, be prepared to take a more sympathetic stance towards arguments being advanced by 
the state as to the scope of positive obligations required to demonstrate ‘respect for family 
life’, meaning that a breach of Article 8 would be less likely to be found. A same sex couple 
considering bringing an application from such a state, but aware that the factors referred to in 
Oliari would not apply in that state, might therefore be deterred from proceeding since they 
would anticipate that an application would probably prove futile.
132
  
 
Even if the decision in Oliari had been less equivocal, the chances that a same sex couple 
would bring an application on a similar basis from certain especially socially conservative 
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member states particularly opposed to recognition of homosexual rights, are low. If 
Strasbourg’s reluctance to declare a clear ECHR right to a registered partnership was due to 
the reception such a declaration might have in some member states if applications from them 
were encouraged, it appears to have failed to take account of the reality of the situation of 
same sex couples in a number of Central and Eastern European states, most notably 
Azerbaijan, Turkey, Armenia, Ukraine or Russia.
133
 In such states, or parts of them, same sex 
couples are very likely to prefer not to live openly as a couple but as apparent flatmates or 
merely as friends due to the hostility and intimidation they would otherwise tend to face,
134
 
possibly even including ‘honour’ murder.135 A future application based on Oliari would 
therefore be highly unlikely in such states; applicants might need to rely on anonymity or 
seek asylum elsewhere in Europe,
136
 but clearly in such a climate safety and security would 
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not lie in seeking open, official acknowledgement of the relationship, rendering unavailing 
any application based on Oliari in practice, even if it was successful. Clearly, however, this 
basis for non-disturbance of the refusal to provide for forms of registered partnership in such 
states relates to sustained and extreme discrimination against a minority, a matter that the 
ECHR was devised originally to address.
137
  
 
Combatting discrimination against same sex partners in Central and Eastern Europe  
 
The stance of states towards same sex couples in Central and Eastern Europe is, clearly, far 
from uniform in accordance with their differing cultural and religious traditions,
138
 and in 
some states action to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation is currently evident, 
bolstered by findings from the Council of Europe, Reports to the UN or from activist human 
rights groups,
139
 and by the need to deepen ties with the European Union.
140
 Thus, clearly, 
any concerns the Court has as to the reception of findings in favour of a specific legal 
framework for same sex unions under the ECHR, do not relate with equal force to the various 
states in question, as the following discussion demonstrates. The Czech Republic and 
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Hungary already have registered partnership schemes for same sex couples,
141
 as does 
Slovenia, which also passed a same sex marriage Bill in 2015, the first post-Communist state 
to do so.
142
 Croatia’s Parliament passed a law allowing civil partnerships for same sex 
couples in 2014, as did Estonia, also in 2014, by enacting the Registered Partnership Act, 
which came into force in 2016. In 2012 a registered partnership Bill was submitted to the 
Slovakian Parliament but was not passed; however, public opposition to recognition of same 
sex unions appears to be weakening.
143
 In 2015 a Bill was put forward in Latvia to modify the 
Civil Code to provide for registered partnerships.
144
 The proposed law would have allowed 
‘any two persons’ to register their partnership and thereby they would have acquired almost 
the same rights and obligations as married couples, but the proposal was rejected.
145
 Bulgaria 
considered adding different sex and same sex couples to its Family Code in 2012 but has not 
so far done so. A package of proposed constitutional reforms is currently before the 
Ukrainian parliament and includes a proposal for same sex unions,
146
 but the proposal is 
opposed by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations. In 2015 the 
Legal Committee of the Romanian Chamber of Deputies considered a legislative proposal 
aimed at legalizing same sex registered partnerships, the third proposal of that kind 
introduced in less than three years, but it was rejected. Three draft laws on gender neutral 
registered partnerships have been considered so far in the Polish legislature, but none have 
yet been passed into law.
147
   
 
As the Court pointed out in both Vallianatos and Oliari, the European consensus – in the 
sense of taking account of the introduction of same sex registered partnerships in member 
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.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78044&NewsCatID=351. 
144
 The Bill was put forward on 30 January 2015 by Veiko Spolītis, a Member of Parliament for Straujuma's 
Unity party. 
145
 By the Legal Affairs Committee on 24 February 2015: Latvijas Sabiedriskie mediji. 
146
 As reported on 20 September 2015.  
147
 As reported on 19 December 2014 at the latest attempt 185 MPs voted for the bill, with 235 against, and 18 
abstentions. 
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states - is currently strengthening.
148
 Although, as discussed, the decisions in question, 
especially Oliari, are somewhat unclear as to the precise role consensus analysis linked to the 
margin of appreciation played in them, they do indicate that as the consensus on this matter in 
Europe strengthens,
149
 the margin of appreciation accorded to individual states will narrow as 
to implementing their positive obligations under Article 8.
150
 Given that post-Oliari the 
introduction of same sex marriage/registered partnerships will continue to grow in Europe,
151
 
and states that have introduced them will be in a clearer majority by 2017, it would be 
expected that the Court’s analysis of the consensus would change in future, meaning that it 
would be prepared to find that the margin of appreciation accorded to states which have not 
introduced registered partnerships has narrowed. However, since Italy’s argument based on 
its margin under Article 8(2) was rejected in Oliari, and Article 14 was not considered, the 
decision as to Article 8 partly turned on the requirements of ‘respect’ for private and family 
life which, as discussed, were found to relate to the existence of the factors identified in a 
particular state. Arguably, the Court therefore created some latitude for itself to avoid finding 
a breach of Article 8 in future even after a greater convergence of standards on this issue in 
Europe has occurred, possibly with a view to debarring consensus analysis from performing 
its expected role where opposition might be anticipated to future decisions on this matter. But 
it is eventually likely to become problematic for the Court to sustain that position as the 
consensus in Europe continues to strengthen, and given that the lack of state protection and 
                                                          
148
 See text to note 110 above. 
149
 Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom recognise same-sex marriage. See note 151 for states that are about to introduce same sex 
marriage. For a list of states authorising some form of civil partnership for same-sex couples see note 110. As 
noted above, in 24 member states there is legislation permitting same-sex couples to have their relationship 
recognised as a legal marriage or as a form of civil union/ registered partnership, and that number is about to 
increase: see note 151. 
150
 Oliari and others v Italy ECtHR 21
 
July 2015 [162]. 
151
 The number of states to have introduced same sex marriage or registered partnerships is about to increase: in 
Ireland, after a referendum to alter the constitutional definition of marriage to encompass same sex unions, a Bill 
to implement the revised definition so as to legalise gay marriage in Ireland was submitted on 23 September 
2015. A German Bill on gay marriage had its second reading on 25 September 2015 and was approved by the 
Bundesrat. Finland’s Parliament approved a same sex marriage measure in 2014 which will come into force in 
2017. The Greek government announced on June 10, 2015, that it will introduce a new law giving civil union 
rights to same-sex couples following Vallianatos (note 75). Slovenia may introduce a same-sex marriage law in 
2016 (see note 142 above); in 2015 Greenland's Parliament approved a same-sex marriage law by a unanimous 
vote 27-0 (the law came into force on 1 October 2015). A fifth attempt to make gay marriage legal in Northern 
Ireland occurred in the region’s parliament, on 2 Nov 2015; it was passed by a small majority but the DUP used 
a Parliamentary veto – ‘a petition of concern’ – to block subsequent legislation. Cyprus introduced a Bill 
allowing for same sex civil partnerships which gained the approval of the Cabinet in May 2015; it has now 
passed to the Parliament where it will be voted on; Estonia’s Registered Partnership Act came into force in 
2016. A civil union bill covering same sex and different sex partners was presented to the Italian Parliament on 
14 October 2015 as a response to Oliari, which passed the Senate in a watered-down version (excluding certain 
parental rights of non-biological parents in same-sex unions) on 25.2.2016. A final vote is expected in April 
2016. 
32 
 
recognition of same sex relationships relates to an especially intimate aspect of family life. In 
a state in which there is no discordance between social reality and the law since both are 
equally affected by a climate of homophobia, the risk of acquiescing in such a climate would 
be expected to lead the Court eventually to rely on the strengthened European consensus 
(including in some broadly comparable Central or Eastern states) and refuse to take the 
internal consensus in question into account, thereby according the state a fairly narrow 
margin of appreciation only. 
 
Moving towards a clear Article 8 and 14 right to a same sex registered partnership 
 
If the Court accepted the approach described in respect of future applications it would 
therefore obviously also have a role in ensuring that a stronger European consensus on this 
matter becomes apparent in future. If an application was brought against a Central or Eastern 
European state, and the Oliari factors were not accorded significance,
152
 the Court would 
clearly be more likely to find a breach of Article 8, which would, assuming that the state in 
question implemented the ruling, then aid in influencing the consensus in Europe and thus the 
Court’s analysis in future cases. Taking a firmer line at Strasbourg on this matter might mean 
that due to their obligations under Articles 1 and 13 ECHR,
153
 the less socially conservative 
Central or Eastern European states, such as Lithuania, where a debate on this issue is 
currently occurring,
154
 might become more receptive to reviewing the lack of provision of 
same sex registered partnerships in their own states, prior to any possible adverse ruling at 
Strasbourg on this matter that they might otherwise face in future. Resulting internal reviews 
as to ECHR-compliance in such states would in themselves have an educative, liberalising 
impact in terms of prompting debate, and would encourage the activity of LGBT activist 
groups. Further, the bars in the Constitutions of a number of states on same sex marriage are 
usually, not invariably, accompanied by provisions on non-discrimination, which, if 
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 The mismatch between social reality and law found in Italy in Oliari is not as apparent in a number of 
Central and Eastern European states (see notes 133 and 134). In Poland, for example, an Opinion poll by the 
Polish Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) in 2013 found 65% of the Polish people opposed to the 
introduction of registered partnerships and 33% in favour. Also the Polish Constitutional Court’s position on 
civil partnerships is not as favourable to their introduction as was that of the Italian Supreme Court (at 
http://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/publications.php). The Polish High Court has given its opinion that all the 
draft Bills on registered partnership were unconstitutional, since Article 18 of the Constitution protects marriage 
(30 January 2013); see ‘Information paper on LGBTI discrimination for The European Commission Against 
Racism and Intolerance’ April 2014 at http://ptpa.org.pl/public/files/LGBT_Raport%20FINAL.pdf. 
153
 See note 130 as to the effect of Articles 1 and 13 ECHR. 
154
 See The Human Rights Monitoring Institute ‘After Oliari partnership debate in Lithuania gets serious,’ 2015, 
at https://www.hrmi.lt/en/new/1044/.  
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interpreted in future by domestic courts by reference to the developing Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, could be found to mandate the introduction of same sex registered partnerships 
to avoid creating discrimination based straightforwardly on sexual orientation.
155
  
 
The decision in Vallianatos could also lead to Strasbourg applications relating to the 
exclusion of same sex couples from an existing registered partnerships scheme since the two 
key factors identified Oliari would not need to be present. Such applications are likely to be 
rare since when states introduce alternatives to marriage that is usually to provide rights to 
same-sex couples. Lithuania, however, provides an example of a state in which Vallianatos 
could be relevant in future. It considered a registered partnership Bill in 2015; a number of 
members of the government were opposed, however, to including same sex couples in the 
legislation,
156
 and it was partly due to concern that they would eventually have to be included 
that the Bill was dropped. If it was reintroduced, but same sex couples were excluded, the 
Vallianatos principle would apply, regardless of finding a discordance in Lithuania between 
social reality and the law in terms of the lived experience of same sex couples, a discordance 
that probably would not be apparent.
157
 Lithuanian same sex couples considering taking 
applications to Strasbourg would therefore be encouraged to do so, and that would obviously 
                                                          
155
 For example, in 2009 the Slovenian Constitutional Court found that Article 22 of the Registration of Same 
Sex Partnerships Act (RSSPA) violated the right to non-discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution on 
the ground of sexual orientation, and required that the legislature remedy the established inconsistency within 
six months: U-I-425/06. While Poland’s Constitution bars same sex marriage, its Constitutional provisions on 
non-discrimination arguably mandate the introduction of a civil partnership law. The Bosnian Constitution 
(Article II) protects the human rights and fundamental freedoms it lists by defining them through the 
‘Enumeration of Rights’ (Article II 3), stating that the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms is secured to all 
persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without discrimination on any grounds (‘Non-Discrimination’, Article II, 4), 
and states that the ECHR has supremacy over all other law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In contrast, the 
Moldovan Constitution, Article 16 of which protects ‘Equality’, does not protect it on the ground of sexual 
orientation. While that is not conclusive, it has influenced the lack of protection on this ground: see ‘Study on 
Homophobia, Transphobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Legal 
Report: Moldova’ by independent researcher Vera Turcanu-Spatari. The study finds: The overall legal 
framework of the Republic of Moldova does not define the terms of discrimination, sexual orientation and 
gender identity; and it does not provide mechanisms of redressing discrimination. The Georgian Constitution 
also does not provide express protection against discrimination on that ground (Art 14) but it does not specify 
that marriage must be between a man and a woman. The Ukraine Constitution also does not provide such 
protection (Art 24) and defines marriage as between a man and a woman (Art 51).  
156
 That includes the Justice Minister: see Human Rights Watch ‘Letter to the Lithuanian Minister of Justice 
Regarding Equal Rights in Relationship Legislation’, 11 June 2015; that is apparently not on the basis that the 
legislation is intended only to protect traditional families, but on the basis that the government considers that 
same sex couples would be such a tiny minority that a new framework is not needed: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/10/human-rights-watch-letter-lithuanian-minister-justice-regarding-equal-
rights. 
157
An EU-wide survey conducted by the EU Agency of Fundamental Rights in 2013 revealed that 61 percent of 
Lithuanian LGBT people who participated in the survey felt discriminated against or harassed in the last 12 
months because of their sexual orientation. See also the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project 4 June 2013 on 
homophobia in Lithuania, at https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/129197. 
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also apply to any other states introducing a registered partnership scheme in future reserved 
for different sex couples. But the other factors discouraging such couples from taking 
applications to Strasbourg might still tend to apply.  
 
Preserving the Court’s authority and legitimacy?  
 
Had the Court in this jurisprudence found in favour of declaring that Article 12 read with 14 
or alone would be breached if same sex couples were excluded from the right to marry, it 
would have been likely to face very strong opposition to its stance in most Central and 
Eastern European states.
158
 Its stance on same sex marriage, as opposed to registered 
partnerships, is arguably strategically understandable at the present time when a number of 
states have taken the step of enshrining their opposition to same sex marriage in recent 
amendments to their Constitutions.
159
 It is possible that, although the Court has previously 
ruled that the ECHR prevails over the national constitution,
160
 such amendments may be 
having an impact on the Court’s stance in the sense that they signal to it in advance that 
recognising a right to same sex marriage is a step it should not take at present if it is to 
preserve its legitimacy in a positivist sense. Aware that it faces such Constitutional barriers in 
some member states, and having already rejected reliance on a ‘liberal’ version of consensus 
analysis in this context, the Court may in future be tempted to react by embracing a 
particularly ‘strict’ version of such analysis whereby a clear majority of states (possibly 
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 See note 159 and text to note 142. Germany, Austria and Switzerland also do not yet allow same sex couples 
to marry, but there is evidence to suggest that, at least in Germany and Switzerland, the opposition would not be 
likely to be as strong. In Germany another same-sex marriage bill was approved by Germany’s Bundesrat in 
September 2015, although it did not pass. The Legal Affairs Committee of the National Council, the lower 
house of the Swiss Federal Assembly, voted 12-2 to approve a ‘marriage for all’ initiative introduced by the 
Green Liberal Party in February 2015. On 28
th
 February 2016 a referendum was held on a Constitutional 
amendment that would have changed article 14 in the Swiss constitution, providing a gender neutral right to 
marry, and bar same sex marriage. The respondents voted by 50.8% to 49.2% to reject the proposal, put forward 
by the Christian Democratic People’s Party. The Austrian Assembly voted by a large majority against a 
proposed resolution to grant lesbian and gay couples ‘the human right of equal marriage’ in June 2015.    
159
 Marriage is defined as a union solely between a man and a woman in the Constitutions of Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. For 
example, in 2013 the Commission tasked with revising Romania’s Constitution adopted an amendment 
describing marriage as a consensual relationship between a man and a woman only, an amendment backed by 
the powerful Romanian Orthodox Church. Previously, the Constitutional article only used the words ‘between 
spouses’ when referring to the marriage partners. 
160
 See United Communist Party v Turkey (1988) 26 EHRR 121. However, the reluctance of the Court to allow 
the ECHR to prevail over the Irish Constitution may explain the refusal to rely on the consensus in Europe on 
abortion in ABC v Ireland (note 27). The Court’s cautious approach to national constitutions does not parallel 
that of the US Supreme Court (see note 17 above and associated text); at least 30 US states had similar 
constitutional amendments, but all the remaining ones were struck down by the US Supreme Court in Obergefell 
(note 92). 
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including comparable states) accepting same sex marriage is needed before it is prepared to 
find that a ban on such marriage in a state creates a violation of Article 12 read with 14.  
 
The Court’s use of consensus analysis in relation to registered partnerships is more variable, 
as discussed, and obviously the consensus here is stronger. The Court demonstrated in Schalk 
and Kopf, Vallianatos and Oliari that it is fairly receptive to recognising an ECHR right to a 
registered partnership, as opposed to a right to same sex marriage, since it appears to view 
such partnerships as reflecting a more neutral, less culturally-specific, secularised conception 
of formalisation of unions. In Schalk and Kopf, Vallianatos and Oliari it was prepared to 
depart from a strict version of consensus analysis to take steps towards that result. States that 
have sought to bar the possibility of introduction of same sex marriage in future, legislatively 
or via their Constitutions, are likely to accept that such bars do not preclude the introduction 
of registered partnerships,
161
 although to varying degrees a number of such states demonstrate 
little or no acceptance that recognition of such partnerships would be desirable.
162
 The Court 
is aware of the opposition to such partnerships in a number of states, and in Oliari it is argued 
that the Court was seeking to preserve its own legitimacy in addressing this issue; if it takes 
decisions that a number of member states clearly or almost certainly will not implement,
163
 
the fragile consensus currently surrounding the Court’s decisions in parts of Europe – the 
respect for its authority - will tend to be undermined. (Clearly, a state strongly opposed to 
judgments of the Court in this context could denounce the ECHR and withdraw from it, under 
Article 58. But it is far more probable – and more insidiously dangerous to the Court’s 
authority - that a disaffected state would stay within the Convention system but evince 
hostility and resistance to the decisions.)  
 
Had a right to a registered partnership been declared in a less equivocal fashion in Oliari, 
same sex couples from some member states, although probably not the most socially 
conservative ones, for the reasons given above, might have been more likely to bring 
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 For example, in 2015 a Bill to legalize same-sex civil unions in Lithuania was found by a parliamentary 
committee not to breach the country’s Constitution, which defines marriage as only being between two people 
of different genders.  
162
 See pp 00. 
163
 Eg Human Rights Watch argued that Azerbaijan's ‘systematic crackdown on human rights defenders and 
other perceived government critics shows “sheer contempt” for its commitments to the Council of Europe’ 
HRW ‘Azerbaijan: Government Repression Tarnishes Chairmanship’ 29 September 2014, at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/29/azerbaijan-government-repression-tarnishes-chairmanship. The 
Economist found in 2013 that the ‘Council of Europe's credibility is being undermined given Azerbaijan’s poor 
record on political prisoners’: ‘Azerbaijan and the Council of Europe’ 22 May 2013. See also note 6 above 
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applications in future successfully challenging the lack of any provision for the recognition of 
same sex unions in their countries.  If the state in question had then failed to implement the 
ruling, which might have been probable, the Court’s legitimacy in positivist terms would 
have been undermined further than it already has been by long drawn out procrastination and 
resistance to implementing its rulings in certain member states, such as Russia.
164
 So even in 
relation to same sex registered partnerships, which are less likely to be Constitutionally 
barred,
165
 it is argued that the Court’s manipulation of the consensus doctrine is being 
deployed at present to seek to avoid confrontations with a number of Central and Eastern 
European states.  
 
But partial dependence on majoritarianism in a single member state as in Oliari exacerbates 
the danger that reliance on the consensus doctrine in general creates - that the Court is not 
fully satisfying its duty as a standards-setter in combatting discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation. It can hardly be questioned that discrimination against same sex unions is 
perpetuated by certain religions; if religious views are allowed to influence legislative 
decisions, as in, for example, Russia, where the Russian Orthodox Church is highly 
influential and openly strongly opposed to recognition of homosexual rights,
166
 then the state 
has allowed the view that a group of citizens are not entitled to equal concern and respect to 
influence policy. If the Strasbourg Court in effect fails to combat that view it has refused to 
follow a central tenet of liberalism, and has damaged its legitimacy in normative terms by 
departing from one of its own founding principles – to prevent the oppression of minority 
groups in member states.
167
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 See note 6 above. Obviously the failure to implement Hirst v UK [2005] ECHR 681 has also contributed 
strongly to that effect. 
165
 See note 161. 
166
 Here is a representative statement: ‘The Orthodox marriage is different from the Protestant marriage, or that 
of the "Western" type….The Orthodox marriage is a Mystery, that is, it is one of the Mysteries of the Orthodox 
Church, alongside Baptism, Communion, etc. For this reason it is not those entering into matrimony who 
perform the Mystery…but it is God Himself Who performs it… The Orthodox marriage is a union of grace, 
blessed by God, while the Protestant or civil marriage is an action taken by mortals, and for this reason is 
without grace… And although the Orthodox Church sternly denounces the "gays," for instance, in the official 
statement adopted by the latest Pastoral Conference of the Western American Diocese of the Russian Orthodox 
Church Outside of Russia, held on March 10-12, the Orthodox Church has nothing to do with homosexual 
marriages, strictly speaking: there is nothing unusual about the godless acting in a depraved manner’ (Priest 
Sergei Sveshnikov ‘Opinion on same sex marriage’ 2006, at 
http://www.russianorthodoxchurch.ws/01newstucture/pagesen/articles/samesex.html). 
167
 The Court has stated that it has taken the position that: ‘democracy does not simply mean that the views of 
the majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of 
minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position’: Baczkowski and others v Poland ECtHR 3 May 2007, 
at [63].   
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It may therefore readily be argued that the Court should, post-Oliari, bearing in mind the 
currently strengthening consensus on the issue, take a bolder, less equivocal stance on same 
sex registered partnerships. So doing clearly might encourage further applications but might 
also tend to embolden activists and others in certain Central and Eastern European states, 
who would therefore be able to bring more effective pressure to bear on their respective 
governments.
168
 Taking a firmer stance at Strasbourg would also enhance the Court’s role in 
counteracting the pressure on some of those states, in some instances emanating from Russia, 
and based on the idea of promoting traditional Russian values as opposed to Western 
liberalism, to maintain a general climate of homophobia evidenced by, in particular, passing 
or seeking to pass ‘gay propaganda’ laws,169 banning or failing to protect Pride parades or 
gay rights’ demonstrations. Clearly, such manifestations have themselves been directly 
addressed by the Court in a number of decisions,
170
 but sending out a clearer signal as to the 
non-acceptability of continuing to exclude same sex couples from specific frameworks 
recognising their relationships could also contribute to a diminution in social acceptance of 
homophobic laws and practices. In turn, receptivity to the Court’s judgments in favour of 
such recognition might be enhanced in some of the states in question, thus diminishing the 
risk of undermining its authority and legitimacy arising when such judgments are met with 
resistance.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has found that the Court is currently opposed to declaring an ECHR right to same 
sex marriage: it is showing acceptance of the exclusion of same sex couples from the ability 
in practice to access the guarantee under Article 12 in a number of member states, and is at 
present far from producing a European equivalent of Obergefell. Given that currently not 
even a thin majority of member states have introduced such marriage, its reliance on one 
version of consensus analysis to take that stance is defensible: a degree of self-restraint based 
partly on such analysis allows the Court to maintain its legitimacy in positivist terms. But in 
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 Eg Organization Q in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a state that does not give official recognition to same sex 
partnerships. 
169
 Such a law is currently in place in Russia, and appears to have influenced attempts, which have not so far 
been successful, in 2013 and 2014, to spread similar laws beyond Russia in, for example, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Moldova. See P. Johnson ‘“Homosexual propaganda” laws in the Russian Federation: are they in violation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights?’ (2015) 3(2) Russian Law Journal 37. 
170
 See eg: Genderdoc-M v Moldova ECtHR 12 June 2012; Identoba and others v Georgia ECtHR 12 May 
2015. See also the decision in Alexeyev v Russia (note 137) with which Russia has refused to comply.  
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taking this stance the Court is opposing a number of core Convention values: in particular, 
weighty reasons have not been found to be needed to justify differentiation based on sexual 
orientation under Article 12 read with 14.
171
 The use of the consensus doctrine has therefore 
clearly allowed states which institutionalise and condone discrimination against same sex 
partners to have an impact on the Court’s jurisprudence, and therefore by extension on states 
potentially less unreceptive to the introduction of same sex marriage.
172
 Thus its stance on 
such marriage neatly encapsulates its struggle to maintain a balance between preserving its 
legitimacy as on the one hand the guardian of core Convention values, and on the other, in 
positivist terms, as a credible and authoritative Court whose judgments are not disregarded. 
Once a thin majority of member states have introduced same sex marriage, the Court may 
revert to reliance on a stricter model of consensus analysis to continue to exclude same sex 
couples from the scope of Article 12, but so doing will make it harder to resist the impression 
that the Court is merely condoning or disregarding persistent discrimination against a sexual 
minority.  
 
The struggle to create a reconciliation between those two aspects of its legitimacy is also 
apparent in its jurisprudence on same sex registered partnerships, but to a lesser degree, as is 
the damage done to the procedural integrity, persuasive power and quality of reasoning in its 
judgments, due to its non-transparent and somewhat arbitrary use of varying models of 
consensus analysis, and the unreasoned diminution or negation of the role of Article 14. This 
article has sought to demonstrate that the device it has relied on to achieve that reconciliation 
in Oliari – taking account of a consensus on such partnerships within a single state – is 
unable to accomplish that task since it represents a model of consensus analysis most 
susceptible to perpetuating discrimination against same sex couples. In general, its use of 
consensus analysis in this context reveals that the Court, on policy grounds, is tending to seek 
to obscure its hesitancy in confronting such discrimination when perpetuated by certain 
member states. It has therefore been argued that in this sensitive social context reliance on an 
internal consensus should be rejected in favour of a search for a consensus within broadly 
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 The current lack of a demand for such reasons in relation to Articles 12 and 14 parallels the previous 
approach in the general context of addressing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation under Article 8 of 
failing to demand such reasons, after a violation was first found on that ground in Dudgeon v UK (1982) 4 
EHRR 149, in a number of instances of inadmissibility decisions between 1982 to 1997: see eg S v UK 
Commission decision 14 May 1986.  
172
 Such as Malta, which has already introduced same sex registered partnerships and recognises same sex 
marriages contracted abroad: http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20140420/local/Changing-times-
divorce-to-legal-same-sex-marriage-in-three-years.515580.  
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comparable member states, but only as one aspect of a more clearly defined European 
consensus. So doing could foster its adoption of a gradualist role in furthering the 
introduction of specific frameworks covering same sex couples in member states while still 
maintaining its legitimacy in positivist terms. While this article acknowledges the progressive 
steps taken by the Court, especially in Schalk and Kopf, Vallianatos and Oliari, it is also 
calling for a more courageous stance from the Court than the one it evinced in Oliari, while 
recognising the obstacles it faces in the most socially conservative states in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
